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Abstract ~ Recently hidden Markov model (HMM) has been 
proved to he a good twl to model normal behaviours of 
privileged processes for anomaly intrusion detection based on 
system calls. However, one major problem with this approach is 
that it demands excessive computing resources in the HMM 
training process, which makes it inefficient for practical 
intrusion detection systems. In this paper a simple and efficient 
HMM training scheme is proposed by the innovative integration 
of multiplwhservations training and incremental HMM 
training. The proposed scheme first divides the long observation 
sequence into multiple subsets of sequences. Next each subset of 
data is used to infer one sub-model, and then this sub-model is 
incrementally merged into the final HMM model. Our 
experimental results show that our HMM training scheme can 
reduce the training time by about 60% compared to that of the 
conventional hatch training. The results also show that our 
HMM-based detection model is able to detect all denial-of- 
service attacks embedded in testing traces. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Anomaly intrusion detection is one of two major intrusion 
detection techniques namely misuse detection and anomaly 
detection [4]. Generally, an anomaly intrusion detection 
scheme constructs models of subject behaviour, and considers 
any significant deviation from normal behaviours as part of an 
attack. Anomaly intrusion detection has the potential to detect 
unknown attacks because no prior knowledge about specific 
intrusions is required [4]. 
Intrusion detection can he considered as a data analysis 
process [4]. This is particularly true in anomaly intrusion 
detection where intrusion detection systems collect and 
process large volume of raw data from various sources such as 
network traffic and activity information of users and 
programs. Data processing techniques such as data mining, 
machine learning and statistics have been commonly used in 
intrusion detection systems. 
In 1996, Forrest and her colleague [ I ]  are the first researchers 
who proposed the idea of using programs' system calls to 
operating system kernel to detect the anomalous activities of 
programs. It is empirically proved that short sequences of 
system calls produced by the execution of some Unix 
privileged processes such as sendmail and named are a good 
discriminator between the normal and abnormal operating 
characteristics. They constructed a simple detection scheme 
that consists of two phases: ( I )  building a list of unique short 
sequences of a program's system calls in normal operation as 
normal database and ( 2 )  testing input short sequences against 
the normal darabase to find the anomalies. If a mismatch is 
found, the short sequence is considered to be anomalous. The 
idea has been extensively extended in their later work [Z] with 
wide range of experiments on various Unix programs under 
synthetic and real working environment. The experimental 
results have also confirmed that short sequences of system 
calls are stable and consistent during program's normal 
activities. This method is simple and efficient because it  
requires only one pass through the training data to build up 
the normal database. However, the method may generate a 
high number of false alarms because it is impossible to build a 
complete database covering all scenarios. 
Warrender et a1 [3] continued the work along this line and 
investigated various data processing methods through 
extensive experiments. They used the enumerating method 
[I]. frequency based method, data mining, and hidden Markov 
model to build up the detection models from the system call 
traces. The experimental results have shown that hidden 
Markov model can generate the most accurate results on 
average. The major drawback of HMM approach is that 
HMM training demands excessive computational resources. 
Several other HMM based anomaly intrusion detection 
approaches can he found in [5] and [6]. In [SI, Qiao er a1 first 
built up a HMM from the input system call trace, and then 
used this HMM to transform the input sequences of system 
calls into the sequences of hidden states. Finally they applied 
the enumerating method [ I ]  on the hidden state sequences to 
build the normal database to detect anomalous sequences. 
This transformation, however, cannot solve the problem of 
incomplete database since the mapping between the input 
system calls and output states is one to one. A complete 
database of hidden states cannot he built from an incomplete 
input data set. 
In 161, Hoang et a1 have proposed a "Multi-layer model" to 
address the issue of incompleteness of normal database. The 
proposed model integrates the enumerating method [ 11, 
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frequency based method, and HMM into single hybrid 
detection system so that it can alleviate the problem of 
incompleteness of normal darabase and also increase the 
detection accuracy. This method comprises of two phases: the 
training phase and testing phase. In the training phase, a 
normal darabase and a HMM are consuucted from the system 
call traces of a program's normal operation. In the testing 
phrase, the input sequences are first compared against the 
normal database; if a mismatch is found the suspected 
sequence is then passed to the HMM for further verification. 
By using such two verification layers on suspicious 
sequences, this method is reportedly able to reduce the false 
a l m  rate and the necessary amount of training data 
effectively. However it demands very high computational cost 
for HMM training, especially with large-size HMM and long 
system call traces which makes it infeasible for online 
intrusion detection. 
The HMM training using multiple-observation sequences 
algorithm (HMMMOSA) [9] has been successfully applied in 
speech recognition. The idea of using multiple-observation 
sequences is useful for reducing demands on training time and 
memory resources. In order to solve the aforementioned 
HMM training problem for the anomaly intrusion detection, 
we introduce and modify the HMMMOSA scheme in this 
paper. Our new HMM training scheme first divides the long 
training sequence into a number of subsets of sequences. 
Next, each subset of data is used to train one sub-model and 
then the sub-model is incrementally merged into the final 
model. This step is different from the HMMMOSA scheme 
where the training of all sub-models is completed first and 
then they are merged into final model. With this modification, 
the HMM training scheme has become incremental. Therefore 
it can further reduce the resource demands of the 
HMMMOSA scheme, which makes it suitable for online 
intrusion detection. Our experiments on the sendmail and 
inetd data [I21 show that our HMM training scheme can 
reduce the training time and memory requirements 
significantly. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Part 2 first 
provides a brief introduction to the hidden Markov model. 
Then we describe HMM modelling of normal behaviour of 
programs. Pan 3 illustrates the proposed HMM training 
scheme for anomaly intrusion detection. Part 4 presents 
experimental results and analysis and part 5 is our conclusion. 
2. PRELIMINARY 
2.1 Hidden Markov Model 
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a double embedded 
stochastic process with two hierarchy levels. The upper level 
is a Markov process, in which the states are not observable. 
Observation is a probabilistic function of the upper level 
Markov states. Different Markov states will have different 
observation functions. 
HMMs are very powerful modelling tools although they are 
computationally expensive [7]. HMMs have been widely used 
in DNA sequence modelling, speech recognition and pattern 
recognition. For convenience, we use the same HMM 
notations as that in [8]. A HMM has the following elements: . . . 
. . 
. 
. 
. 
. 
N number of states in the model 
M: number of distinct observation symbols per states 
T: length of observation sequence, i.e. the number of 
symbols observed 
i, : state in which we are in at time t 
V = { v , ,  v2, ... , v M ) :  the discrete set of possible 
observation symbols 
n = ( E ; ] ,  n; = P(i, = i) : the probability of being in 
state i at r = 1 
A = (au), a ,  = P(i,+, =j, i, = i): the probability of 
being in state j at time r+l given that we were in state 
i at time r. 
B = { b j ( k J ] ,  b,(kJ = P(vk at r I i, = j )  : the probability 
of being observing symbol vk given that we are state j .  
0 = {O,, 02, ... , O,, ... , Or):  observation sequence; 
0, denotes observation symbol observed at timer. 
And 1 = {A, B, n) will be used as compact notation to denote 
an HMM. 
2.2 Building HMM to Model Program's Normal Behaviour 
We consider the system call trace of a program produced in 
its execution as the observation sequence and each system call 
in the trace as one observation symbol in terms of HMM 
notations. The first step in building HMM is the selection of 
the HMM size. The number of unique system calls used in the 
program's trace is defined as the number of distinct 
observation symbols M. The selection of number of states is 
based on the number of unique system calls used by program 
in the trace [3]. In our specific HMM models we choose the 
number of states N equal to the number of distinct observation 
symbols M. Specifically, we select N=M=23 for sendmail 
program (stide data set [IZ]) and N=M=35 for inerd'program. 
We choose our HMM as ergodic model [7] in which states are 
fully connected, and transitions are allowed from one state to 
any other states. 
Our HMM based intrusion detection scheme consists of two 
phases and is presented in Fig 1. In the training phase, the 
system call data are first transformed to HMM observation 
sequence. Next the HMM is inferred from the observation 
sequence. In the testing phase, the system call data are first 
transformed to HMM short sequences, and then the HMM is 
used to compute the probability of each test short sequence in 
order to determine if it is normal or anomalous. A pre-defined 
probability threshold is used in the testing process. 
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Figure 1. HMM training and testing far anomaly 
intrusion detection based on system calls 
2.3 HMM Batch Training Algorithm 
We use the well-known Baum-Welch algorithm [7] to train 
our HMM sub-models. The HMM training using Baum- 
Welch algorithm is considered as batch training because it 
allows only one Observation sequence. Given the observation 
sequence 
0 = IO,, Oz, _.., O r ) ,  the algorithm estimates HMM model’s 
parameters 1 = (A,  B, x ) .  to maximize P ( 0  I 1). The Baum- 
Welch algorithm can be described in brief as follows [7]: 
1. Let initial model be lo 
2. Compute new model 1 based on lo and observation 
sequence 0 
3. If log(P(0I 1)) - log(P(0I lo))< DELTA go to step 5 
4. Else set lo - 1, and go to step 2 
5. stop 
where DELTA is a pre-defined threshold value of the natural 
logarithm of the probability. 
3. PROPOSED HMM INCREMENTAL 
TRAINING SCHEME 
3.1 Data Sets 
We use the “inetd” and “sride” data sets given in [ 121 for our 
experiments. The procedures of generating and collecting 
these traces are described in [I], [2] and [3]. Each trace is a 
list of system calls produced by processes of a program during 
its execution. We select the live sendmail and inetd data 
collected at the University of New Mexico (UNM) to use in 
our experiments. The data include: 
Normal traces: traces collected during the program’s 
normal activities including sendmail daemon traces 
and sendmail‘s sub-processes. The sendmail data 
consist of 13,276 traces with the total of 15,631,952 
system calls. The inetd data include a single trace 
with 541 system calls. These traces are used to build 
the hidden Markov models. 
Abnormal traces: traces come from a program’s 
abnormal runs that generated by intrusion tools for 
some known intrusions. Specific anomaly traces used 
include 105 traces of a denial-of-service attack on 
sendmail and a single trace of a denial-of-service 
attack on inerd. 
3.2 HMM Incremental Training from Multiple Observarion 
Sequences 
Gotoh et all [IO] proposed efficient HMM training schemes 
using incremental ML and MAP estimation algorithms for 
speech recognition. The HMM incremental training has the 
advantage of faster convergence than that of traditional batch 
training. However, their algorithms only hold when the 
subsets of training data are independent. In our training data 
set, the system calls are in interactive relations and condition 
of independent subsets does not hold. Davis and other authors 
[9] proposed a simple method to learn HMM from multiple 
observation sequences (HMMMOSA). in their approach, first 
the set of sub-sequences are used to learn a set of sub-models 
independently. Next, when the learning of all sub-models is 
complete, the sub-models are merged together based on 
weights to produce the final HMM. No constraint of 
independent subsets is required in this method. 
In our approach, we modify the HMMMOSA scheme [9] to 
make it become incremental. Our new HMM training scheme 
first divides the long training sequence into a number of 
subsets of sequences. Next, each subset of data is used to train 
one sub-model and then the sub-model is incrementally 
merged into the final model. The training scheme can he 
described in the following steps: 
1 .  
2. 
3. 
4. 
5.  
Divide single observation sequence 0 into K 
sub-sequences (OilJ, 0,~). ..., OiK,]. 
Initialise the HMM final model 1 - 0 (empty 
model). 
Take a sub-sequence Oii, to train sub-model A,, using 
HMM batch training algorithm described in section 2, 
sub-section 2.3. 
Incrementally merge APJ into final model 1. 
Repeat steps 3 and 4 for all sub-sequences. 
A graphical presentation of our scheme is shown in Fig 2 in 
which hk,’a”’ is the final HMM model at k observation 
sequences. 
The HMM parameters in the incremental merging step of the 
sub-model A,, and the final HMM 1 are calculated as follows: 
a,i = wk* ai?’+ w * a, 
ni=wk*n,’k’+ W * &  
- 
- 
b ,j = wi * b,” + w * b, 
- 
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where wk = I I P(OfkjI&,), P(O,k,l&) is the probability to 
generate sub-sequence 0 1  from model Ax, and 
w = 1 / P(O,,,, Op,, Ofk.,,IIJ, P(O,, ,  O,Z,, O~k.l l I IJ is the 
probability to generate sub-sequences { O,,,, 0,2,, Occ,,) from 
model 1. ++- hd"' &kyu' z 
O(KI 
Figure 2. Incremental HMM Training 
from multiple sub-sequences 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Experiment Design and Results 
We have conducted several experiments on the sendmnil and 
inerd data sets described in section 3, sub-section 3.1. The 
HMM training DELTA threshold is 0. I .  All HMM sub-models 
have the same size as the size of the final HMM. First, we 
measure the efficiency of our HMM incremental training 
scheme against the traditional HMM batch training in terms of 
training time and memory requirements. Next, we test our 
HMM based detection models on two denial-ofservice 
(DOS) attacks on sendmail and inerd. In these experiments we 
use HMM models to compute the logarithm of the 
probabilities ( fog(P))  of test sequences, and we consider these 
values as anomaly signals. The length of short sequences used 
is 20 system calls. 
Fig. 3 shows the relation between the HMM training time and 
the number of sub-sequences in our scheme. The sendmail 
data set is used in this experiment with the total length of 
1,000,000 system calls. The traditional HMM batch training is 
shown in the figure with sub-sequence number of I .  
Fig. 4 shows log(P) of length-20 sequences in trace produced 
by a denial-of-service attack on the inetd program. The,DOS 
intrusion embedded in inerd trace is clearly detected by the 
anomalous signal of the sequences between 13 and 30. 
Fig. 5 shows log(P) of length-20 sequences in trace produced 
by a denial-of-service attack on the sendmaif program. The 
sendmaif DOS intrusion is also clearly detected by the 
anomalous signal of the sequences between the start of the 
trace and sequence 2500, and between sequence 9000 and the 
end of the trace. 
-batch training 
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multiple sequences. The total length of all sub-sequences is 
1.000.000 system calls. When the number of sub-sequences 
is I it is  the traditional HMM batch Iraining. 
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denial-of-service attack on .sendrwil. 
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4.2 Discussion 
Table I shows the HMM training time of batch training mode 
(training with single sequence) and our scheme. It is clear that 
our training scheme is much more efficient than the batch 
mode in all number of sub-sequences tested. On average, our 
scheme can reduce about 60% training time compare to that 
of batch training. The training time of HMMs in our scheme 
depends on the number of sub-sequences. Generally, the 
training time decreases when the number of sub-sequences 
increases. However, the length of sub-sequences should not he 
too small because it may lead to the over-fitting of HMM 
parameters. In our experiment, we define the minimum length 
of the sub-sequence based on the size of HMM model. 
TABLE I .  RLLIT~ON BETWEEN HMM WCRXMLNTAL 
'IRAININGTIML "THE N"h,(BLKOII"B- SIOIILNCLS 
sub-sequences 
1 Nwberof  I Traininetime I Inconmarison to I 
(mi;) I batch mode (%I 
I (batch mode) I 43.33 
I 10 I 16.67 I 38.46% 1 
100.00% 
I 20 I 14.98 I 34.58% 1 
40 
I 30 1 14.43 I 33.31% I 
13.32 30.73% 
50 15.57 
As the memory requirements for HMM training are in the 
complexity of O(2NT) [3], where N is number of hidden states 
and T is the length of the training sequence, our HMM 
training scheme uses shorter training sequence and hence, 
demands less system memory than that of batch training. 
In addition, a significant reduction of the training time and the 
incremental estimation of HMM parameters make it feasible 
for our scheme to be used in online HMM training for real- 
time intrusion detection in which the working HMM model is 
updated dynamically from on-going data. 
Fig. 4 and 5 clearly show that our HMM based detection 
model is able to detect all denial-of-service attacks on server 
applications embedded in testing data such as sendmail and 
inetd. The log(PJ values of anomalous sequences are 
significantly smaller than that of normal sequences. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a HMM incremental training scheme from 
multiple observation sequences for anomaly intrusion 
detection has been presented. Our experimental results show 
that our HMM training scheme can save up to 60% training 
time compared to batch training. The scheme is very 
promising for use in the online HMM training for real-time 
intrusion detection. 
35.92% 
Open Issues 
The initial values of HMM parameters in the training are 
sensitive factors to the convergence rate. In this paper we 
simply adopted the popular approach of using random valueS 
for HMM initial model. Searching for the optimal HMM 
initial values will be an interesting research question. 
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